INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this document is to discuss the challenges of agreeing international climate
change policies while considering competing national interests.
Firstly, the reasons, why, action should be taken is established followed by the constraints
preventing, or interfering with, why Nations find it difficult to reach agreements at the
international level. This will be led by describing how analysts use ‘Game theory’, in
particular ‘The prisoners dilemma’ to try and predict the position that Nations might adopt
during negotiations and the inherent weaknesses these theories contain. Governance, or
the lack of it is then considered, followed by the interference of national interests and how
these are affected by internal state preferences. However, agreements are reached, and the
discussion is completed by looking at the mechanisms and inducements which are used to
persuade Nations to sign up to both bilateral and multi-national agreements in an effort to
control ‘climate change’ and, in particular, CO2 emissions.
DISCUSSION
The effects of climate change are global and either indirectly or directly affect us all. A stable
climate is of benefit to us all and therefore can be considered a ‘public good’. The current
warming planet affects even those that haven’t contributed to the problem and as the
effects can’t be mitigated or stopped by one Nation alone it becomes a ‘Collective action
problem’ (Brown, 2009).
Therefore, Nations have to work together and forge agreements and actions to prevent the
‘Public good’ from becoming a ‘Public bad’ by the increasing saturation of CO2, in the
atmosphere, and it’s believed warming effect.
Unfortunately, in reality, there are political constraints that prevent Nations from forging
international agreements despite the fact that overall it is ultimately beneficial to all that
such agreements are reached.
So, what are these constraints and why do they make it difficult for agreements to be
reached? This discussion will consider Nation state preferences and what states seek to
achieve at the international level and how these affect negotiations at international level.
Participation of Nation states can vary from modest to extensive depending on how Nations
‘frame’ what the problem is in the first place and what are the cost/benefits of doing
anything about it.
Analysts use ‘models’ to try and predict how one Nation might react to a given set of
circumstances. ‘Game theory’ and in particular ‘the prisoner dilemma’ are used for such
purposes. However, they are based on making certain assumptions. It assumes that players
‘Nations’ will act rationally, there will be no communication between the players, neither
will know what the other will do, neither can trust the other and both will act self-interest
not mutual interest.
However, these assumptions denote an extreme position which, in reality, do not occur.
Models have their uses but in the words of Elinor Ostrom, from her book ‘Governing the
commons’ taking models and metaphors too literally can mean you arrive at an overly
pessimistic conclusion (Ostrom, 1990, p.6, as cited in Brown, 2009).
Negotiating Nations do communicate, both bi-laterally and multi-laterally, and agreements
in some form are reached. One of the problems is the lack of governance. The principle of
State sovereignty states that an individual state has the exclusive right to determine its
domestic and foreign policies (Brown, 2009). Therefore due to this political authority is
dispersed amongst the negotiating Nations and no unified system of government presides
to effect governance. On the face of it that means that Nations cannot be sure that others
will not renege on their commitments and do nothing (cheat) and take a ‘free ride’ on other
Nations contributions.
Nations, such as the United States of America (USA), are considered ‘powerful’ in that thhave large resources and their participation will be a benefit, potentially, to all. However,
they may decide that acting unilaterally is more cost effective and decide to either renege
on its contributions or simply not engage.
Frank.E. Loy, Undersecretary for Global affairs, US State department and head of US
delegation to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
negotiations in the House 2000 stated ‘When considering a treaty, the question we must ask
ourselves are do the costs outweigh the benefits? Does the signing of a treaty amount to a
net loss or net gain in terms of our national interests?’ (Barrett 2003, p.165, as cited in
Brown, 2009).
So, Nations will be looking for gains out of any treaty and the maintenance of National
security. Any treaty would be less effective if powerful Nations, such as the USA, cannot be
induced to enter negotiations.
This is a good place to introduce ‘State preferences’ before continuing the discussion on
how Nations manage to negotiate any treaties. Within each Nation there are state politics
where different ministries, lobbyists and other campaigning groups will be competing for
resources and have differing view points on what is best for their Nation. Some of these
groups will be more powerful than others, for example the Oil companies in the USA, who
donate large sums of money to support sympathetic politicians and of course tax revenues.
Therefore, a Nations government will be unlikely to enter into an international agreement if
this is not acceptable domestically. Negotiations are therefore likely to use ‘backward
reasoning’ limiting what they are likely to sign up to (Barrett, 2003; Putnam, 1998, as cited
in Brown, 2009). State government decisions may then be watered down or weakened by
internal bodies that are more dominant and powerful applying more leverage than other
internal bodies who ultimately lose out.
An example of internal ministerial differences is that of Japan. Both its Ministry of the
Environment (MOEJ) and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) have both issued
reports that appear to take fundamentally different directions confusing Japan’s long-term
strategy to combat Carbon emissions (Climateactiontracker.org).
State preferences may also change over time which can affect agreements already made.
This has been demonstrated by the USA’s part within the Kyoto Protocol. Originally signed
up to by President Clinton, later rescinded under President Bush, then a switch to more
proactive approach under President Obama and rejected once more by the current
incumbent President Trump.
Interestingly States, within the USA, have been adopting their own more cooperative
policies such as Carbon taxes and Cap and Trade schemes to encourage reductions in CO2
emissions. Also, the latest United Nations (UN) Emissions Gap report states that more than
7000 cities from 133 countries and 6000 companies have pledged to take climate action.
(UNEP 2018).
Equality and equability, or lack of it, will also have bearing on what an individual Nation will
be prepared to commit too. Developing states will argue that the developed states have
already contributed to the levels of CO2 into the atmosphere and that they should burden
more of the cost and share technology to allow developing Nations to expand industrially.
Equally Nations that will be adversely affected by climate change and who have not
contributed to the problem will ask that the matter be treated with a matter of urgency and
cooperate globally to deal with the issues. Developed Nations on the other hand will be
concerned with losing any competitive edge with the potential effect of reducing economic
growth and damaging national security. Once again self interest and domestic politics can
get in the way of mutually beneficial agreements.
So far, we have concentrated on the arguments as to why Nations may not sign or join in
with mutually beneficial international agreements. However, agreements are forged, and
actions agreed and supra-nations like the European Union (EU) have led the way in not only
taking action but also applying governance to its constituent members. The Kyoto Protocol
is another example. Despite this, power and inequality still play a large part in international
negotiations and it is inevitable that those with the most power will play a larger part and
the effectiveness of agreements reflect this.
This also leads to the possibility that major players will pull out if they don’t get what they
find acceptable effectively applying a veto.
At the international level then what can be done to induce a reluctant Nation into an
agreement. To smooth out inequalities the Kyoto Protocol formulated flexible mechanisms
(flex mechs, as they are better known) such as the Clean Air mechanism (CDM) allowing
designated developed Nations (Annex 1) to pay for emission mitigation or ‘sink’ activities, in
a developing Nation and then deduct the emissions saved or offset from its own emissions.
Cap and Trade also offer companies the opportunity to gain financially by being allowed to
sell any of its emissions allowances, which it may have purchased in the first place, on the
open market. Effectively creating a Carbon pricing mechanism. Both methods have their
critics. Developing countries may not like having a flex mech foisted upon them to mitigate
another’s emissions. Cap and Trade mechanisms have been criticised for setting Carbon
allowances to high, initially, which reduce the Carbon price and therefore reduce the
effectiveness of the mechanism. These mechanisms evolve over time and do appear to be
acceptable to the more powerful of Nation states.
Despite their perceived problems some would say that these agreements are better than no
agreement at all. Another form of inducements is ‘side payments’ (Brown, 2009). Where
one Nation will effectively be worse off by engaging but others gain overall the inducement
comes from the Nations gaining by offering a part of their financial gain to the Nation that
loses overall. The net effect is for all the Nations to gain overall. These inducements
hopefully help to prevent the more powerful Nations from adopting their fall-back positions
that might cause them to withdraw from negotiations.
Given that the effects of a warming planet cannot be certain and there is also uncertainty as
to whether forthcoming new technologies will assist with emission control and of course a
natural phenomenon, for example increased volcanic activity, may disrupt our climate at
any time in the future which makes it very difficult to assign monetary values to potential
gains and/or loses. Critically, it could be considered that inducements and other incentives
are no more than creative accounting.
CONCLUSION
If there is a general consensus that Anthropogenic caused climate change is harmful to the
planet and mankind one would assume that it would be rational for Nations to forge
international agreements which serve to agree a common set of actions in an attempt to
mitigate or adapt to the perceived problem. This however is not the case as internal,
interstate, international politics and lack of governance prevents there being a smooth
pathway to such agreements.
Apart from self-interest and concerns over national security there is still a powerful
argument, expressed by some, that scientists still disagree about the effects and causes of
the present climate change. Also, arguments as to the cost/benefits both of acting today or
at some time in the future are of concern which affects whether there is sufficient moral
and political weight to future humans.
However, agreements are reached, and actions taken despite the aforementioned
problems. Unfortunately, to obtain agreements, inducements and other mechanism are
used. The more powerful states are able negotiate concessions, to keep them at the
negotiating table, which inevitably water down and reduce the overall effectiveness of any
agreements.
Copyright M. Taylor 2018
REFERENCES
Brown, W. (2009)’Collective action or collective failure? The International politics of
climate change’ in Humphreys, D. and Blowers, A (eds) DU311 Earth in crisis: A warming
world, chapter 4, Milton Keynes, Open University.
“Paris Tango. Climate Action so Far in 2018: Individual Countries Step Forward, Others
Backward, Risking Stranded Coal Assets | Climate Action Tracker.” Accessed December 2,
- https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/paris-tango-climate-action-so-far-2018-
individual-countries-step-forward-others-backward-risking-stranded-coal-assets/.
“Emissions Gap Report 2018 Key Messages.” UN Environment. Accessed December 2, 2018.
http://www.unenvironment.org/resources/report/emissions-gap-report-2018-key-messages.
The Inevitable Climate Change 